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Abstract: The paper investigates relationship between working memory efficiency, defined as the result of its’ processing 
& storage capacity (Oberauer et al., 2003) and the tendency to (1) create assosiative memory distortions (false memories, 
FM); (2) yield under the influence of external, suggesting factors. Both issues were examined using extended version 
of Deese-Roediger-McDermott procedure (1959, 1995), modified in order to meet the study demands. Suggestion was 
contained in an ostentatious feedback information the participants (N=88) received during the DRM procedure. Working 
memory (WM) was measured by standardized tasks (n-back, Jaeggi et al., 2010; automatic-ospan, Unsworth et al., 
2005). Study included 3 conditions, differing in the quality of suggestion (positive, negative or neutral). Participants 
were assigned into 3 groups, depending on results they achieved completing the WM tasks. Obtained results alongside 
the previously set hypothesis, revealed that (1) WM impacts individuals’ tendency to create false memories in DRM and 
(2) that the individuals showing higher rates in WM tasks are less willing to yield to suggestion compared to those with 
lesser ones. It also showed that the greater amount to shift (Gudjonsson, 2003), emerges under the negative suggestion 
condition (collating positive). Notwithstanding that the interaction effect did not achieve saliency, both analyzed factors 
(WM and suggesting content) are considered as meaningful to explain memory suggestion susceptibility in presented 
study. Although, obtained results emphasize the crucial role of WM efficiency, that is believed to decide the magnitude of 
feedback that is influential in every subject. Therefore, issue demands further exploration. 
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Introduction
The way people proceed and memorize information 
determine the way they create representations of an 
outward reality in their own minds (Johnson et al., 2012; 
Sternberg & Mio, 2009). The accuracy and exactness 
of such traces seems crucial to determine individual’s 
susceptibility to a wide range of memory distortion 
(including the tendency to create false memories) and 
willingness to yield to suggestion contained in ostentatious 
feedback information (Bartlett & Bartlett, 1995; Murphy 
& Balzer, 1986; Schacter et al., 1998; Schacter & Coyle, 
1997). Many studies demonstrate that individual’s showing 
greater results in cognitive tasks are able to remember 
events more precisely, commit less of memory lapses as 
well as show a lower tendency to create a wide range of 
memory distortions that emerge as a consequence of trace 
deficits as compared to those with lesser results (Hirst & 
Echterhoff, 2012; Kiyonaga, Egner & Soto, 2013; 2012; 
Maciaszek, 2013a).
Despite the fact some individuals are more vulnerable 
than others, there is a general agreement that people present 
a tendency to create vivid, long-lasting false memory 
traces (Atkins & Reuter-Lorenz, 2008; Tse & Neely, 2005). 
Distortions occurring within the semantic memory, (e.g. 
inducted by associations, Ulatowska & Olszewska, 2013a) 
are believed to be transferred into the episodic memory and 
remembered in a similar way to the real ones, filling the 
lapses of “true” memory traces (Maciaszek, 2015; Meadea 
et al., 2007; Zhu et al., 2012).
In accordance with this, conducting a study focused 
on individual cognitive factors essential for this process 
seems justified. What is worth emphasizing, recent studies 
show crucial role of working memory (WM) determining 
individuals vulnerability to a wide range of memory errors, 
such as misleading information effect (Zhu et al., 2013; 
2010), SMF errors (Johansson & Stenberg, 2002; Purić 
& Lalović, 2010), suggestion susceptibility (Dasse et al., 
2015; Gheorghiu et al., 2012; Polczyk, 2007), as well as 
false memories (Roediger et al., 2014). 
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This paper presents results delivered from experi-
mental study of false memory phenomena (FM), evoked 
by modified DRM procedure (list of words related; Deese, 
1959; Roediger & McDermott, 1995) and its relationship to 
individual’s suggestion vulnerability in reference to partici-
pant’s working memory efficiency (Alberts, 2010; Atkins & 
Reuter-Lorenz, 2008). 
Working memory
WM is believed to be one of the most important 
cognitive processes, responsible for quality of people’s 
everyday functioning, taking part in all the daily activities. 
It is also involved in much more demanding affairs e.g. 
problem solving (Orzechowski & Maciaszek, in press; 
Orzechowski, 2012; Orzechowski et al., 2009). Working 
memory efficiency is most commonly defined by its 
processing and storage capacities (Oberauer et al., 2003). 
However it is generally agreed WM impacts human 
functioning in many ways, (e.g. individuals with higher 
WM rates are able to maintain desirable information 
selectively and inhibit the activation of irrelevant ones (in 
order to not interrupt the main task performance, Druey & 
Hübner, 2008), some aspects of WM are presumably more 
expected to be more relevant within the process of creating 
memory distortions than the others. 
Alberts (2010) adverts the leading role of WM in 
explaining memory distortion phenomenon, claiming that 
the capacity to control (defined as a possibility to keep 
balance between activated and inhibited representations 
among limited working memory resources) is crucial to 
perform a task correctly. These findings are congruent 
to previously conducted study that shows a significant 
impact of working memory efficiency (within its executive 
function, strongly connected with inhibitory control, IC, 
in view of Alberts) to a tendency to create false memories 
by subjects. Participants with higher working memory 
efficiency rates demonstrated lesser tendency to create false 
traces – average difference was about 14.6%, compared to 
individuals with lower WM functioning (meaning rate of 
false memories for high-WM participants was 2.85 and for 
low ones: 4) (Maciaszek, 2014a; 2015). 
False memories
Importance of individual differences among 
cognitive processes, in order to explain memory distortion 
susceptibility is emphasized in recent studies. According 
to Johansson and Sternberg (2002; similarly to Pimentel 
& Albuquerque, 2013), resemblances of enumerated 
phenomenon may be caused by source monitoring factor 
(SMF) errors, in general: lapses in executive control within 
the attentional and working memory processes (Miyake & 
Friedman, 2004). Smith and Engle (2011) present another 
point of view, emphasizing the relevance of cognitive 
resources involved in particular data processing operation 
(see also: Smith, Hunt & Gallagher, 2008). They claim that 
more resources engaged to code information in memory, 
enable proceeding on a deeper level (Craik & Lockhart, 
1972). That assures higher precision, better quality and 
greater amount of remembered details, which means lower 
probability of creating a false memory trace (Flegal & 
Reuter-Lorenz, 2014).
The complex way to explore the mentioned 
phenomenon and measure its magnitude is to evoke 
FM under laboratory conditions, e.g. using the DRM 
paradigm (list of words related; Deese, 1959; Roediger & 
McDermott, 1959). Basing on an assumptions of semantic 
memory network theory (Collins & Quillian, 1969), it is 
possible to foresee that the similarity of words presented 
to participant during the procedure and non-presented 
critical items (which are strongly connected), would 
cause an appearance of such words in succeeding memory 
test (Collins & Loftus, 1975; Maciaszek, 2013b; 2014). 
Recognition of critical item is regarded as a false memory 
creation (Dehon, 2012; Mao, Yang & Wang, 2010; Monds 
et al., 2013). In current study DRM procedure was applied 
to investigate whether individual differences in working 
memory efficiency affect varied FM rates under the 
influence of suggesting feedback.
Compellingly, many researcher point that individual 
sensibility to yield external cues while recalling the 
material (in opposite to be guided by internal cues, e.g. 
Dehon, Laroi & Linden, 2011) leads to a greater rate of 
false memory traces. Moreover the correlation between 
a tendency to produce FM, and undergo suggestion 
and misleading information effect also appears 
(Chaiwutikornwanich, 2005; Nichols, 2014; Zhu et al., 
2013). Such findings stay in line with supposition that 
factors impeding appropriate identification of information 
source, may cause the failure of distinction between 
internal (memory-originated) and external (contextual) 
stimuli within the memory traces (e.g. a „context confusion 
phenomenon”, Baddeley, Kopelman & Wilson, 2002). As 
an effect, various types of memory mistakes and distortions, 
including false memory traces emerged. These findings 
are congruent to the thesis presented by Dehon, Laroi & 
Linden (2011), including correlation of subjects’ tendency 
to be directed by external memory cues (while recollecting 
earlier memorized stimuli) and higher memory distortion 
susceptibility, compared to individuals often using internal 
cues. What is interesting, the “vulnerable participants” have 
shown significantly lower working memory capacity. The 
tendency to be directed by external information, usually 
an outward stimuli, contrary to internal memory traces is 
related to poorer cognitive functioning. 
To sum up, recent findings led to set the following 
hypothesis, which will be verified using regression analysis.
H1: Working memory efficiency (in order to its 
proceeding and storage capacities) affects a tendency to 
create false memories. Individuals showing better WM are 
able to create less FM comparing to poorer ones.
Suggestion susceptibility
Suggestibility, usually defined as a degree of personal 
willingness to accept suggestion of others, along with 
a tendency to act accordingly to its content (Collins 
Dictionaries, 2014), is often explained by lapses in source 
monitoring factor (SMF, e.g. Kopelman & Wilson, 2002), 
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connected with working memory executive functions 
(Miyake & Friedman, 2012; Johansson & Stenberg, 
2002). Researchers suspect that individual disposition to 
commit such errors may be related to a different influence 
vulnerability, by link to external-internal cues dependence 
(Dehon et al., 2011). In other words, individuals strongly 
depending on external cues demonstrate greater tendency 
to yield suggesting information, compared to internal-cues 
driven (Kopelman & Wilson, 2002). What is compelling, 
if such mechanism appears, the way of introducing 
suggestion (social, para-social, or non-social) shouldn’t 
affect significant differences (see also: Szpitalak et al., 
2015). Thus, results delivered from research with use of 
non-social (impersonal) influence, as applied in presented 
study, may be recognized on a general field of suggestion 
susceptibility.
Worth mentioning is that many researchers claim the 
outward factors play a significant role in deciding about 
individual’s vulnerability to a wide range of distortion, 
including FM phenomena, suggestion susceptibility etc. 
(e.g. Zhu et al., 2013). Outward factors are often being 
defined as extrinsic to a subject, emerging from an outward 
situation (see also: Szpitalak & Polczyk, 2012; 2014).
Interestingly, some studies show that suggestion 
vulnerability may be viewed as a psychosocial 
phenomenon, focusing on individual’s tendency to 
change (behavior, answering pattern or decision-
making strategy) under the influence of external factors 
(e.g. information provided to participants during the 
experimental procedure). As many aspects of this issue 
remains unexplored, presented study purpose is to shed 
a light on suggestibility in order to elicit vulnerability by 
manipulating an informational feedback, strengthened by 
some additional affect (Fiedler, Lundy & Sheehan, 2012).
Results analog to described above, came from 
a great number of studies over false memories, suggestion 
and misinformation susceptibility (e.g. Eisen et al., 
2002; Jachinski & Wentura, 2002). What is appealing, 
some experimental data reveals that the content of 
suggestion matters as well as the way that it is presented 
– according to Storbeck (2013), negatively affective 
cues observed during the DRM experiment increase 
monitoring processes, by drawing attention to distinctive 
information which finally lets subjects to reduce false 
memories (thanks to very precise encoding and high level 
of control in a memory test). Interestingly, Zhu et al. 
(2013) observed an occurrence of significant correlation 
among subjects’ vulnerability to wide range of memory 
distortions, including false memory traces, suggestion 
and a misinformation effect that may be explained in 
terms of “general discrimination ability”. Nevertheless, 
recently published evidence is too weak to be considered as 
conclusive at this part of a studies. In line with this, setting 
hypothesis 2 seems appropriate:
H2: Working memory efficiency is related to 
individuals’ tendency to yield to suggestion.
To examine this issue in a comprehensive way, various 
methods of data analysis, including descriptive statistics, 
correlation coefficients and ANOVA and UNIANOVA 
will be applied. Hypothesis 2 itself will be verified using 
variance analysis. Worth mentioning is that the additional 
purpose of presented studies is to establish whether the 
suggestion content (positive, negative or neutral) affects 
different rates of FM and if there is a relationship between 
size of an effect and WM efficiency rates. This assumption 
will be verified by comparing results of WM tests for 
individuals showing low, medium or high rates to FM rates. 
Method
Participants
The data was collected from 88 undergraduate 
university students. As two of them did not follow the 
procedure, they were excluded from analysis, so the final 
sample consists 86 subjects (22 men and 64 women) in age 
18–25 (average: 20.91; SD=1.89). Participants, informed 
about taking part in an anonymous, scientific research 
measuring memory skills, signed an agreement before the 
experiment began. After that they were randomly divided 
into the one of three experimental group conditions. At the 
beginning all the participants received an instruction to 
perform each of three cognitive tasks as quick, but also as 
precise as possible. 
Design and materials
The experiment took place at the Jagiellonian 
University Experimental Psychology Laboratories. 
All the necessary actions were executed with the use of 
Millisecond Inquisit Software. Procedure includes 3 stages, 
conducted in the same order by all the participants. Stage 
1 and 2 consists standard WM tasks: n-back (Jaeggi et 
al., 2010) and automatic o-span (Unsworth et al., 2005), 
measuring cognitive variables such as summary number 
of correct reactions to the stimuli, total error rate, reaction 
times (RTs) etc. What is worth emphasizing, is that both 
tools require memorizing some specific stimuli, which 
should be recognized afterwards. Stage 3 was designed 
to look similar to 1 and 2 for participants (with some 
irrelevant exceptions), which was important to conceal 
the real purpose of the study. In fact, stage 3 consists 
a modified version of DRM procedure, previously 
translated, re-written and implemented to the C++ language 
system requirements, in order to conduct whole procedure 
with use of computer. The aim of experiment design was 
to collect rigorously precise data, being able to compare 
the results derived from WM tests and a DRM-evoking 
FM procedure, under the diversified external influence 
conditions (suggestion content). 
In general, DRM procedure was designed to measure 
an occurrence of false memories (FM, Roediger et al., 
2001). Recently, the phenomena is commonly viewed as 
an tendency to create FM, differing among individuals. 
In line with this, few modifications were brought into to 
the original experiment design. Total rate of critical lures, 
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recognized by participants after a presenting a set of lists 
including words-related was – invariably – a measure of 
a tendency to create false memories. 
In Deese–Roediger–McDermott paradigm experiments 
the participant studies the list of semantically related words 
(usually 12 to 15) divided in few sets. It is assumed that 
remembering words from each list activates the semantic 
network – if the activation is strong enough, it spreads 
automatically onto the other words related with those 
presented while studying (Collins & Loftus, 1975; Collins 
& Quillian, 1969). The point is to construct the procedure 
in a way that enables to elicit a resemblance of a specific, 
predictable memory trace – critical lure, that appears in the 
later memory test as one of the words presented before. 
In DRM paradigm each list of words has (but not always; 
see: Beato & Arndt, 2014) a potential to create one critical 
lure, that becomes a false memory trace (participant 
reports the sense of remembering presentation of particular 
word, so it is claimed that it was transferred into the 
episodic memory; see also: Maciaszek, 2015; Meadea 
et al., 2007; Monds et al., 2013; Sergi et al., 2014). Due 
to experiment design (specified in the next paragraph), 
it was expected to find some additional relations among 
standardized rates. Firstly, unlike the previous studies, two 
sets of DRM list were used, separated by the suggesting 
feedback information. Such design enables to look follow 
at least three independent variables: (1) the number of 
FM after first set, (2) the number of FM after the second 
set and (3) index of change among the answering pattern 
– the “shift” rate, calculated by subtracting rates from 
the first and the second part of a study (lures created by 
participants after #set1 and #set2 memory test), is believed 
to be the main factor defining suggestion vulnerability 
in this study. The tool’s reliability evaluation has been 
discussed in paragraph “Results”, in reference to present 
findings. However, such design was clearly inspired by 
Gudjonsson’s Scale of Interrogative Suggestibility (GSS, 
1984a; 1997, see also: Polczyk & Dukała, 2013), factors 
expected to cause change in participants’ answering pattern 
remain slightly different. Main assumption of GSS is to 
measure subjects’ willingness to make false confessions, 
supported by a tendency to accept false allegation 
as a consequence of interrogate behavior during the 
subsequent questioning (Gudjonsson, 2003). Despite some 
similarities to presented research, GSS procedure, typically 
used in forensic cases, remains focused on social factors 
responsible for subjects tendency to change answering 
patterns among succeeding memory tests (e.g. larger 
distance between subject and the experimenter in terms of 
competence, power and control causes higher suggestibility, 
Gudjonsson, 1984b). Moreover, GSS measures only change 
inducted by a negative feedback information provided by 
interrogate (Wojciechowski, 2015; Polczyk et al., 2004). 
Apart from that, current study is dedicated to investigate 
a role of sole suggestion influence, which participants are 
exposed to as an effect of positive suggesting feedback 
information as well. Such manipulation is believed to show 
a comprehensive impact on their performance in the next 
stage of procedure.
Procedure
As mentioned, WM tasks were performed by 
participants before the DRM procedure starts. WM 
is presumed to balance individuals tendency to yield 
FM-evoking context (lists of semantically related words) 
with its’ capability to control the magnitude and the 
coverage of spreading activation effect (and appearing FM 
as a consequence). WM measurements were implemented 
into the experimental design in order to define participant’s 
cognitive properties (in particular). However, in reality, 
the crucial part of the experiment was the manipulation 
conducted during the DRM procedure. Figure 1 presents 
the general scheme of experiment, including the differences 
in suggesting information condition.





NEGATIVE POSITIVE NEUTRAL 
SET #2 SUGGESTING 
FEEDBACK 
condition 1: 
condition 2: condition 3  
(control): 
In order to conduct the presented study, it was 
necessary to design a computer version of DRM lists of 
words related paradigm. The procedure similarly to the 
original version consisted of presentation lists of words, 
semantically related to each other and to a non-presented 
critical item. After a presentation, including 2 sets (8 list x 
15 words related each), participants completed a memory 
test, in which they were asked to distinguish items 
presented and non-presented, by pushing “yes” or “no” 
buttons on a keyboard. 
Participants were randomly divided into 3 experimen-
tal conditions. Condition 1 and 2 include receiving osten-
tatious feedback information that is strongly suggesting 
(respectively: 1 – positive and 2 – negative). Participants 
subjected to the procedure under the 3rd condition, received 
feedback information voided from suggestion (control 
group): the message they received between DRM sets #1 
and #2 presentation was neutral. It was expected to observe 
change in performance of DRM task in suggested, com-
pared to non-suggested group. The measure of this change 
was considered to be the measure of susceptibility to sug-
gestion incorporated in the feedback information.
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 In general, each group received feedback information 
that included short information about the level of 
participants’ performance in actual task, comparison to the 
average rate and a purposive instruction how to perform 
next part of the procedure. It is worth emphasizing that all 
the messages were ostentatious – dependent on condition, 
not participants’ real level of performance. After the 
procedure ended, participants were debriefed and informed 
about the real purpose of the procedure. Differences in 
conditions are presented in table 1. 
Note that ostentatious feedback information given to 
subjects, was automatically generated by the computer and 
the rate of “accuracy” was random within certain interval 
in each group. 
Results and discussion
According to hypothesis 1, it was expected to find 
significant impact of individual’s working memory 
efficiency and a tendency to create false memories. Table 1 
displays descriptive statistics for all the measures used 
in analyses, for both the false memory and the working 
memory rates.
Due to previous studies (Maciaszek, 2013a; 2015) as 
well as other researchers findings (Bixter & Daniel, 2013; 
Jaschinski & Wentura, 2002), WM was expected to play 
a significant role in FM-creating process. 
In order to verify hypothesis 1 and evaluate the 
influence WM’s efficiency (referring to its proceeding 
and storage capacities; Jaeggi et al., 2010; Oberauer et al., 
2003) on individual’s tendency to yield FM phenomena, 
regression analysis was performed. A multiple regression 
was run to predict FM rates after the first set of DRM lists 
(worth reminding is that at this point of experiment all the 
participates run the same procedure – there was no external 
influence before this part). Predictions were made from 
variables: (1) WM storage capacity (defined as a summary 
number of errors in n-back task) and (2) WM proceeding 
capacity (mean rates of reaction time to correctly response 
trials in n-back task). Model 1, explaining about 12.5% 
of the variance in the dependent variable is presented in 
table 2.
The dependent variable was a number of false 
memories after the first part of the experiment (correlations 
for all measures used in analyses – see: appendix). Both 
of the tested variables: (1) total number of errors and (2) 
mean reaction time in n-back procedure, turned out to 
be significant independent predictors of FM rate in the 
analysis. Such results led to a straightforward conclusion, 
that WM affects individual’s tendency to create FM, what 
confirms hypothesis 1. Such results stand in accordance 
with other research findings, forms part of a broader 
research direction, highlighting the role of individual 
differences among cognitive processes in the process 
of creating FM (Johnson et al., 2012; Roberts, 2002; 
Silbermann, 2007).
Modifications implemented to the original DRM 
procedure and re-writing it into the full-computer 
version, demand the evaluating the measurement validity. 
However, Cronbach’s alpha was .91, further analysis 
Table 2. Multiple regression analysis for the criterion: number of false memories (rate: „lures #1”) 
after presentation first set list of words related
FM (lures #1)
Independent variable B SE β t
Constant 6.69 .95 7.13
WM storage -.04 .01 -.27 -2.58
WM proceeding -.00 .01 -.27 -2.57
R2=.124, F(2, 83) = 5.88; p < .01
Table 1. Differences in experimental conditions due to the content of ostentatious feedback information
Condition 1 (–) Condition 2 (+) Condition 3 (0)
Feedback positive negative Neutral
Accuracy 0–30% 70–100% –
Comparison to ‘standard’ 
task performance above average below average average
Instruction memorize better memorize as well as previously
memorize material as 
precisely as possible
Note. The assumption of equivalence between DRM sets #1 and #2 was made due to previous results, showing no significant difference 
between the potential of each list to evoke FM (Olszewska & Ulatowska, 2013a).
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were executed. The t-test was conducted separately for 
each group to establish whether presence of suggestion 
affects participant’s tendency to change answering pattern 
(shift index). The test showed only participants in control 
condition (M1=4, SD1=1.34; M2=4, SD2=1.88) did not 
differ generating FM between set#1 and set#2, t(24)=0.53, 
n.s. Both experimental groups showed significant 
differences between these rates. In condition 1 the mean 
result after set#1 was 3 (38% of maximum possible 
produced lures; SD=1.96) and after set#2 – 5 (63%; 
SD=1.67), which was statically salient t(30)=-3.37, p<0.01 
(SD=2.03). Respectively, for condition 2, set#1 elicited 
mean rate of 4 FM (50%; SD=1.23) and set#2 – 5 (63%; 
SD=1.76), t(29)=-2.79 (SD=1.52). Interestingly, the shift 
index showed similar properties: post-hoc analysis revealed 
it was significantly differing between suggested and non-
suggested participants (see: table 3).
Such analysis could be also prosecuted by compar-
ing results of undertaken studies to criterion derived from 
a previous research (criterial accuracy) or by providing 
a variance analysis to collate the results under the criterion 
of congruency to researcher expectations (discriminatory 
accuracy). Presented method meets both the criteria. The 
mean rate of FM without influence of suggestion (after 
set #1) is exactly the same as the mean rate revealed in 
DRM experiments conducted before, with use of paper-pen-
cil method (M=4; see also: Maciaszek, 2012, 2014). Such 
result should be interpreted as a confirmation of reliability 
of the computer version of DRM procedure. 
What is more compelling is that the important variable 
– the “shift” index, originally presented in a current study, 
turned out to be a reliable index of an individuals’ tendency 
to change the answering pattern, as the variance analysis 
shown (F(2,83)= 4.31; p<0.05). Significant differences 
among this rate were observed in both suggested groups 
(respectively; negative and positive conditions), contrary to 
non-suggested control group (“neutral”) (see also: table 3).
To verify hypothesis 2, the relationship between 
WM efficiency and subject’s vulnerability to yield to 
suggesting feedback information in-between group 
analysis was examined. Participants executing procedure 
in condition 1 (negative suggestion) were expected to have 
an increased FM rate (from set #1 to #2) as a consequence 
of internalizing the information content. Also it was 
supposed that subjects with positive-suggestion condition 
(2) would be able to lower their FM rates after receiving 
a message of an outstanding result of their performance 
(Ling, Ismail & Abdullah, 2015). On the other hand, such 
predictions were not supported by any empirical findings, 
so that hypothesis 2 includes only the assumption that some 
changes between different experimental conditions would 
be observed and connected with subjects WM efficiency. 
In order to investigate this issue, apart from 3 different 
experimental conditions, participants were subdivided into 
3 groups, alternatively by dependence of their WM span 
(correlation matrix displayed connection between this factor 
and a “shift” index – r=0.29; p<0.01). Obtained results 
included only participants receiving a suggestion during 
the procedure (conditions 1 and 2) – control group was 
excluded from this analysis due to lack of suggestion that 
may cause a “shift” between two sets of DRM task. Study 
results revealed that subjects showing low, medium and 
high WM efficiency differ significantly on willingness to 
undergo suggesting feedback (F(2,83)=6.58; p<0.01). What 
is appealing, only high WM subjects were able to avoid 
internalizing suggesting feedback information – positive 
shift rate means that they created lesser FM under the 
influence (set 2), than without it (set 1; however, this effect 
Table 3. Descriptive statistics values for measures used in analyses











suggestion 30 4 (1.23) 50 5





Neutral (control) 25 4 (1.34) 50 4a (1.88) 50 0.53 (0.38) 24 0
b c d 




61 4 (1.68) 50 5 (1.70) 63 -4.34* (1.78) 60 -1
d 
(1.80) 15 (10.70) 603 (118.38)
Total 86 4 (1.58) 50 5 (1.81) 63 -3.16 (1.90)* 85 -1 (1.90) 16 (9.94) 600 (118.49)
Note: Lures #1 – number of false memories generated by participants after first set of DRM lists presentation; lures #2 – after second 
set; shift – tendency to change answering pattern as a function of experimental condition; n-back errors – a mean number of errors 
committed in n-back task; n-back RTs – a mean time of proper reactions during n-back task trials. Standard deviations in parentheses. 
a, b, c, d – means differ significantly (NIR test post hoc analysis at the level of p<.05).
* – groups differ significantly (t statistics) at the level of p<.01
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wasn’t significant). Visualization of this results demonstrate 
figure 2. As well, figures 3 and 4 compare observed relation 
to other variables measured in experiment. 
Figure 2. The magnitude of differences among “shift” 
index within diversified WM efficiency participants
Note: only experimental conditions (1 and 2) were analyzed. 
Higher rates of “shift” index indicate increasing number of 
FM between set#1 and #2 DRM list of words related, lower – 
decrease. It is clearly shown participant with low and medium 
WM are willing to yield suggesting feedback, contrary to high-
WM individuals, which are able to resist such influence.
Figure 3. Tendency to generate false memories 
(rates: lures 1, lures 2) and change answering pattern 
(rate: shift) by participants as a function of WM efficiency
Moreover as it turned out the proportion of critical 
lures was dependent on suggestion content as well as 
cognitive skills (see: tables 2 and 3). Significantly, 
substantial differences in the rate of FM were observed, 
arising immediately after presenting a second set of DRM 
lists in positive-suggestion condition (increase from 50% 
to 63% lures) compared to control (50% in both parts of 
the experiment). It may mean that – contrary to intuition 
– positive suggestion impacts participants immediately, 
causing a significant increase of FM under the influence of 
positive feedback information. On the other hand, negative 
feedback is being processed longer, due to individual 
differences, so it’s influence could be observed only while 
analysis considered an impartial indicator of change – 
shift index in present study increased significantly in both 
conditions. Longer processing causes deeper encoding and 
explains the pattern of results, in which negative suggestion 
affected change in FM rates in size of 15% and positive 
– 9% (the level of change in control condition remains 
insignificant). In line with presented explanation seems 
reasonable (see also: Olszewska & Ulatowska, 2013b). 
Visual presentation of obtained results is shown on figures 
2 and 3.
Figure 4. Relationship between a tendency to create 
false memories (rate: lures #1) and participant’s 
willingness to yield suggestion (rates: lures 2; shift) 
in dependence WM efficiency
Note: analysis include only participant receiving suggestion 
(condition 1 and 2).
Results in groups differing WM efficiency were 
significant, so the hypothesis 2 may be confirmed.
Obtained results could be interpreted in reference 
to lack of cognitive resources that are required to encode 
information effectively. Further findings may lead to 
a conclusion, that the more cognitive resources are 
available for individual, the less costly it is to divide them 
to specific task demands (Nęcka & Chuderski, 2010). The 
total amount of resources is believed to be WM-dependent 
(Baddeley, 2002; Kahneman, 1973). Thus, high WM rates 
make an individual able to avoid unappropriated influence 
of suggestion thanks to accessibility of resources that may 
be allocated to inhibition (IC, referring to Alberts, 2010).
However, another explanation seems more convincing. 
Having enough cognitive resources in disposal allows the 
cognitive system to choose a proper reaction strategy, 
accurate to current task demands. It also decides about 
the level of executive control intensity in dependence 
of expedience (Bednarek, 2011; Maciaszek, 2013b). 
Therefore, strategy defined as an “unreflective” relates 
to a tendency to yield to an impact of exterior cues as 
a consequence of low level of cognitive engagement. That 
includes control, resources etc., but is also believed to 
cause high memory distortion vulnerability. It is contrary 
to “reflective” decision-making strategy that, despite being 
distinctively more costly and requiring strong executive 
control processes engagement, provides better results in 
majority of cognitive tasks. (Maciuszek, 2012; see also: 
Maciaszek, 2013a; 2015). Presumably, such effects occur 
as a consequence of cognitive effort involved in performing 
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particular tasks (Lindsay, 2014; Śpiewak, 2013). Estimation 
the amount of cognitive resources required to perform 
the task effectively, depends on working memory. 
Moreover, evidence derived from a previous studies 
show that participants handling a reflective strategy show 
significantly lower tendency to create false memories, 
compared to impulsive ones (which were discriminated 
by high strategy index and quick reaction for the stimuli): 
t(92)= -2.54; p<0.05) (Maciaszek, 2014a; 2013b). 
To provide further investigation of relationship 
between WM, suggestion content and a tendency to yield 
to FM phenomena, a GLM univariate test was conducted, 
utilizing a 2 (suggestion content: positive vs. negative) x 3 
(WM efficiency – low vs. medium vs. high) mixed design 
(see: table 4). 
The analysis revealed a main effect for “WM 
efficiency”, F(2,81)=3.97, p<0.05. The main effect of 
“condition” as well as the “WM efficiency” and “condition” 
interaction effect, did not achieved significance. Such 
results led straightly to a conclusion, that WM plays 
a crucial role in FM generating process. As presented data 
shows, WM is not only an important factor to determine 
if FM could be inducted, but is also related to individuals 
tendency to yield to suggesting feedback information (see: 
figures 2 and 3). 
In general, data-driven analysis revealed that 
subjects showing greater WM efficiency create less 
false memories after receiving the suggesting feedback 
information, compared to those with poorer efficiency. 
This dependency was found both at positive as negative 
suggestion conditions, what could be explained that 
every suggestion, independently of its content focuses 
subject’s attention, so the stimuli could not be proceed at 
the optimal level. Memory trace, emerging as a result of 
too narrow processing, remains uncompleted, so that – in 
line with early experimental findings – there is a necessity 
to supplement it (Bartlett, 1932; Roediger et al., 2014). 
Individuals showing high rates of WM are capable to 
encode memory trace more precisely, ignore the distraction 
and – as an effect – became less vulnerable to create FM 
as well as yield to suggestion (thus, being sure of memory 
accuracy, they feel no need to search for external cues).
On the other hand, obtained results show that the 
negative suggestion (condition 1) led to a greater amount 
of FM (however, the difference between positive-suggested 
group wasn’t significant), what meant that the negative 
information is being proceed in more permanent, long-
lasting and sustainable way, so its influence on subjects 
displays as a higher level of willingness to change (shift). 
High WM rates enables avoiding lapses caused by a lack 
of complete memory traces, but – obviously – doesn’t give 
a guarantee (only a possibility, making individuals more or 
less vulnerable).
Conclusions
The phenomenon of creating false memories is 
considered by many researchers to be a fascinating 
experimental problem itself. What is compelling, strong 
empirical evidence show the significant role of cognitive 
factors (working memory, in presented study) to explain 
this phenomena. The assumption that the issue is related 
to other kinds of memory distortion, as well as general 
sensibility to be guided by external cues (especially, 
suggesting feedback information) is appealing. 
As using the DRM paradigm, researchers often focus 
on particular lists (or even words) and their properties, 
(e.g. “FM-evoking potential”; Gallo, 2013), or a number 
of words that are necessary to activate semantic memory 
association network (Atkins & Reuter-Lorenz, 2008; 
Beato & Díez, 2011; Roediger et al., 2014; Tse & Neely, 
2005), still little is known about factors inducting memory 
distortions among humans’ cognitive processes. Conducted 
study showed that working memory efficiency plays 
a crucial role in this process. Individuals achieving better 
results in WM tasks were able to control the process 
Table 4. A GLM univariate test on the effect of WM efficiency (3 levels) and suggestion content (2 levels) 
on a tendency to yield false memory phenomenon
Source df F p eta2
Corrected model 8 2.42 <.05 .20
Constant 1 7.25 <.01 .09
WM 2 3.97 <.05* .09
Condition 2 2.01 .14 .05




R2 = .201 (adjusted R2 = .118); p<.05
* p<.05
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of spreading activation in more effective way and as 
a consequence – create less FM. In general, the better 
WM, the less FM occur in one’s memory (hypothesis 1) 
(Maciaszek, 2013a; 2015). Accordingly, between-group 
analysis revealed, individuals showing better WM 
efficiency present lower vulnerability to yield suggestion 
(received during the procedure) and are less willing to 
change their answering pattern under the influential 
stimuli, compared to those with poorer ones (hypothesis 2). 
No interaction effect between experimental condition and 
participants’ WM efficiency suggest the influential impact 
of working memory on a tendency to yield external factors, 
independently of external situation. Notwithstanding, the 
magnitude of this effect may be dependent on individuals 
WM efficiency. Thus, the issue demands further studies.
Enriching this topic by investigating the connection 
between tendency to yield FM-evoking external context 
(associations spreading automatically over the semantic 
memory network), suggestion susceptibility and 
relationship to individual cognitive abilities, seems worth 
attending. Regarding the limitations of presented study 
(e.g. a low number of participants, that hinders the use 
of complex methods of data analyzing), obtained results, 
staying in consonance with actual trends in cognitive 
science, has an additional value by developing existing 
knowledge in a field of basic research in experimental 
psychology.
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